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Abstract 
Does the European Commission (Commission) manage to transform and re-direct the roles 
played by Commission civil servants? To test the old neo-functionalist claim on loyalty 
transfer among civil servants, this article provides fresh survey and interview data on 
seconded national experts in the Commission. The transformative powers of the Commission 
are tested by assessing the extent to which seconded national experts adopt supranational role 
perceptions. Theoretically, the emergence of supranational role perceptions is accounted for 
by considering (i) processes of pre-socialisation outside the Commission, (ii) processes of re-
socialisation inside the Commission, and (iii) organisational incompatibility between the 
Commission and domestic ministries and agencies from which the secondees originate. The 
empirical analysis shows that secondees evoke multiple loyalties, notably towards own 
profession, own DG and Unit and towards the EU and the Commission as wholes. Crucially, 
the data reported demonstrate that the Commission indeed instils supranational role 
perceptions into secondees. This observation reflects processes of re-socialisation inside the 
Commission, the organisational composition of the Commission as well as organisational 
incompatibilities between the Commission and domestic ministries and agencies. The data 
does not report robust evidence of pre-socialisation outside the Commission. Hence, the 
Commission is indeed a ‘hothouse for supranationalism’. 
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Introduction1 
Does the European Commission (Commission) manage to transform and re-direct the roles 
played by Commission civil servants? To test the old neo-functionalist claim on loyalty 
transfer among civil servants (Ruggie et al. 2005), this article provides fresh survey and 
interview data on seconded national experts in the Commission (SNEs in Commission 
phraseology). The transformative clout of the Commission is tested by assessing the extent to 
which SNEs adopt supranational role perceptions. Theoretically, the emergence of 
supranational role perceptions among SNEs is accounted for by a composite institutional 
perspective. According to this perspective, SNEs may evoke a supranational role due to: (i) 
processes of pre-socialisation outside the Commission, (ii) processes of re-socialisation inside 
the Commission, and (iii) organisational incompatibility between the Commission and 
domestic ministries and agencies from which SNEs originate. The empirical observations 
show that the Commission indeed instils supranational role perceptions into SNEs. SNEs 
evoke multiple loyalties, notably towards own profession, own DG and Unit and towards the 
EU and the Commission as wholes. These observations reflect processes of re-socialisation 
inside the Commission, the organisational composition of the Commission as well as 
organisational incompatibilities between the Commission and domestic ministries and 
agencies. The data does not report robust evidence of pre-socialisation of SNEs outside the 
Commission. Hence, our findings challenge the claim by Hooghe (2005) that processes of 
socialisation of Commission officials mainly occur at the national level and not inside the 
Commission. The Commission is indeed a ‘hothouse for supranationalism’. 
 
This article has two ambitions: First to assess the extent to which SNEs evoke a supranational 
role (relative to other roles) and secondly to theoretically account for actor-level 
supranationalism. The Commission is a crucial test-bed for assessing the extent to which the 
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international executive institutions (IEIs) impact on the role perceptions of individual civil 
servants. Arguably, if actor-level supranationalism is not observed among Commission 
officials, we are less likely to discover it inside other IEIs (Trondal, Marcussen and 
Veggeland 2005). One under-utilised laboratory thereof is Commission SNEs. Arguably, if 
supranational role perceptions do emerge among SNEs, this is indeed a robust test of the 
transformative clout of the Commission. SNEs are hired on short term contracts (from 3 
months to maximum 4 years), they remain paid by their home government, and the majority 
of SNEs return to previous positions in domestic ministries and agencies when their 
secondment period expires (Trondal 2004a). Despite being under Commission instructions, 
SNEs retain their organisational affiliation to their national ministry or agency.2  
 
Recent literature characterise the Commission by competing images. Whereas some scholars 
picture the Commission as strongly penetrated by national interests (Coombes 1970; Kassim 
and Menon 2004; Menon 2003), other sees at as a neutral brooker (Nugent 2001:115). 
Moreover, whereas some scholars picture the Commission as a transformative institution that 
is able to redirect the behaviour and roles of its incumbents (Egeberg 2005a), other see the 
Commission as a reacting institution to the socialising processes at the member-state level 
(Hooghe 2005). Conflicting images of these kinds reflect (i) surprisingly few empirical 
studies of the decision-making dynamics inside the Commission, (ii) competing theoretical 
approaches to assess Commission governance, (iii) empirical observations from different 
segments of the Commission, and (iv) a variety of dependent variables to assess Commission 
governance.3  
 
This study measures supranational roles as the extent that individual actors feel (i) loyalty and 
allegiance towards the Commission as a whole and/or (ii) feel loyalty and allegiance towards 
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their Director General (DG). A supranational role perception denotes that a shared system of 
rules, norms, principles and codes of conduct is inducted, internalised and taken for granted 
among individual actors. This is consistent with the “type II socialization” as suggested by 
Checkel (2005: 804) whereby actors acquire a positional “organisational personality” inside 
the Commission that is rather distinct from national, professional and departmental roles 
previously internalised (Searing 1991:1249; Simon 1957: 278). A supranational role 
prescribes how SNEs should act and provides categories for belongingness. A role perception 
is a generalised receipt for action as well as a normative system of self-reference that provides 
feelings of allegiance to organised communities. “To the extent that organization members 
identify with their organization, they are willing to act spontaneously in its interest, without 
being told exactly what to do” (Mayntz 1999: 83). Ultimately, role perceptions guide the 
behaviour of actors because roles provide “conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, 
affective ties, and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March 
and Olsen 1995: 30; Selden 1997:140). A supranational role thus implies a ‘shift of loyalty’ 
and a ‘sense of community’ that is integral and endogenous to actors’ self-perceptions 
(Deutch et al. 1957: 5-6; Haas 1958: 16; Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6). This study carefully 
analyses supranational roles as perceived by the SNEs themselves. 
 
This study builds on the notion of multiple roles, implying that actors may adopt 
supranational roles without sacrificing pre-existing roles (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer 2004). 
The Commission, like most executive institutions, has an inbuilt tension between different 
governance dynamics, notably between supranational, intergovernmental, departmental and 
epistemic dynamics (Trondal 2006). Different dynamics may “compete for relevance, even in 
a given context” (Sen 1998: 15). An intergovernmental role is guided by loyalty to their home 
government, preference for national interests, and close contacts with their home base.  A 
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departmental role predict SNEs to be “neutral, intelligent, generalist professionals who advice 
ministers” (Richards and Smith 2004: 779). According to the departmental role, SNEs are 
expected to evoke classical Weberian civil servant virtues, attach identity towards their 
Commission Unit and DG, and abide to administrative rules and proper procedures (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004: 167). Finally, SNEs may evoke an epistemic role: Commission officials 
are highly educated officials, recruited on the basis of past merits, and with a professional 
esteem attached to their educational background. According to the epistemic role, SNEs enjoy 
a great deal of behavioural autonomy. They are assumed to prepare dossiers, argue and 
negotiate on the basis of their professional competences and legitimate their authority on 
neutral competences (Haas 1992). Their decision-making behaviour is expected to be guided 
by considerations of scientific and professional correctness and the power of the better 
argument (Eriksen and Fossum 2000).  
 
To theoretically account for supranational roles among SNEs a composite institutional 
approach is outlined. This composite approach combines insights from middle-range social 
constructivist approaches, institutionalist and organisation theory approaches. Recent social 
constructivist literature have carefully theorised, operationalised and empirically illustrated 
processes of pre-socialisation and re-socialisation within international organisation (e.g. 
Checkel 2005). Institutionalist and organisation theory approaches theorise the organisational 
structures within which social interaction occur (Trondal 2001). Arguably, by combining 
these theoretical building blocks our composite institutional approach may maximise the 
explained variance on actor-level supranationalism. The following set of independent 
variables is derived: (i) dynamics of pre-socialisation outside the Commission, (ii) dynamics 
of re-socialisation inside the Commission, and (iii) organisational incompatibility between the 
Commission and domestic ministries and agencies from which SNEs originate.  
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The article proceeds as follows: The next section outlines a composite institutional approach 
on actor-level supranationalism. Next, a record of survey and interview data on SNEs is 
presented. Finally, an empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. Step I present the multiple 
role perceptions evoked by SNEs. Step II present two OLS regression analyses that explain 
the emergence of supranational roles among SNEs.  
 
A Composite Institutional Approach 
SNEs may arguably evoke a supranational role perception due to (i) processes of pre-
socialisation outside the Commission, (ii) processes of re-socialisation inside the 
Commission, and (iii) organisational incompatibility between the Commission and domestic 
ministries and agencies. Scholars tend to treat institutionalist and social constructivist 
approaches separately (e.g. Wiener and Diez 2004). However, the institutionalist – social 
constructivist divide is narrower than often assumed (Trondal 2001). Both sociological 
institutionalism and middle-range social constructivist account emphasise similar independent 
variables (notably dynamics of socialisation of individual actors) as well as fairly similar 
dependent variables (notably the transformation of role perceptions among individual actors). 
However, whereas middle-range social constructivist scholarship tend to under-theorise the 
organisational context within which social interaction occurs, institutional and organisation 
theory approaches tend to under-theorise the aspect of social interaction. By applying so-
called “both/and” theorising, this study combines micro-mechanisms from institutional (cf. iii 
above) and social constructivist scholarship (cf. i and ii above) to account for supranational 
roles among SNEs (e.g. Checkel 2005; Egeberg 2005a; March and Olsen 2005). Our focus on 
social mechanisms enables the elaboration of fine grained hypotheses of actor-level 
supranationalism – that is, specifying the conditions under which and providing a plausible 
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account of why the independent and the dependent variables are linked in the suggested 
manner (Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 7). 
 
Civil servants live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent information that may 
be attended to at particular decision situations. Formal and informal institutions guide the 
decision-making behaviour of civil servants due to the computational limitations among the 
latter (Simon 1957). Formal organisations “are collections of structures, rules and standard 
operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life” (March and Olsen 
2005: 4). Accordingly, to Schattschneider (1975: 30) “organization is itself a mobilization of 
bias in preparation for action”. Institutions are systematic devices for simplifying, classifying, 
routinising, directing and sequencing information towards particular decision situations 
(Schattschneider 1975: 58). Causal mechanisms that connect institutions and actor behaviour 
are logics of appropriateness, incentive systems and bounded rationality. For example, the 
limited cognitive capacities of civil servants are systematised by vertical and horizontal 
specialisation of formal organisational charts. By specialising organisations each civil servant 
is assigned a formal role that specifies what problems, solutions and consequences s/he should 
de/emphasise (Egeberg 1999). Organisational specialisation lead to local rationalities and 
local and routinised learning cycles among the incumbents (Olsen 2005: 12). The logic of 
appropriateness also guide officials to decision-making behaviour deemed appropriate by 
internalised perceptions of proper conduct (March and Olsen 2005). Moreover, actors often 
have multiple organisational embeddedness, rendering the impact from each institution 
ambiguous to the actor. Independent variables that measure organisational compatibility and 
incompatibility across level of government take this particular concern into account. The 
independent variables derived from this composite institutional approach are discussed in the 
following.  
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Dynamics of pre-socialisation outside the Commission 
The following two proxies are applied to test the impact of pre-socialisation on SNEs’ 
supranational roles: (i) the educational background of SNEs (national vs. international), and 
(ii) their desire of leaving the Commission.  
 
The seminal neo-functionalist studies of elite socialisation did not systematically control for 
the effect of pre-socialisation and self selection (Pollack 1998). This section suggests ways of 
controlling for the effect of pre-socialisation (cf. Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). The theory of 
representative democracy claims that in order to understand government decision-making the 
demographic characteristics of the officials are pivotal (Pfeffer 1982: 277; Selden 1997). 
Important demographic attributes of actors are their sex, age, nationality and education. 
Demographic characteristics of the officials also include his or her past, present and future 
careers. With respect to past careers, studies of the social biographies of civil servants 
demonstrate that educational background is the most important background factor for 
understanding the decision-making behaviour of government officials (Christensen, Lægreid 
and Zuna 2001). According to the neo-functionalist school, epistemic communities of highly 
educated experts support the development of supranational roles. Both the length of education 
as well as type of education matters. Suggestively, an international educational background 
may be conducive to supranationalim among SNEs. SNEs with educational experiences from 
outside their home country or from truly international universities (e.g. the College of Europe, 
Brugge) are more likely to adopt a supranational role perception prior to entering the 
Commission than SNEs with a national educational background.  
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Individual demography and organisational demography interact in complex ways. For 
examples, the recruitment procedures of organisations interact with the background variables 
of actors. SNEs are recruited outside the standardised written Commission procedure based on 
merit. SNEs are in fact recruited through a “submarine procedure” that resembles a quota 
system. The quota system typically recruits officials on more temporary contracts on the basis 
of, for example, political, sectoral or territorial loyalties (Bekke and van der Meer 2000: 281-
282; Ingraham, 1995: xix). Recruitment by the quota procedure is conducive to strengthen the 
impact that the demographic background of officials has on their role perceptions. Ceteris 
paribus, temporary positions increase the likelihood that the background of actors becomes 
relevant for their roles. Officials employed on temporary contracts have a fairly short tenure 
within the organisation and are therefore less subject to organisational re-socialisation than 
full-time officials.  
 
Government officials sometimes have a wish of leaving their organisation. This is likely to 
weaken their loyalty towards the organisation. By contract, SNEs have to leave the 
Commission when their term expires (after a maximum of four years). However, not all SNEs 
have a wish of leaving the Commission, upholding an aspiration of becoming parachuted into 
permanent positions in the Commission services or in the Cabinet. Still, most SNEs foresee a 
return to national government institutions after their visit to the Commission. Ceteris paribus, 
anticipation about future career prospects outside the Commission is conducive to weakening 
supranational role perceptions among SNEs.  
 
Dynamics of re-socialisation inside the Commission 
A large literature argues that the impact of pre-socialisation on actors’ role perceptions is 
modified by organisational re-socialisation (e.g. Checkel 2005; Meier and Nigro 1976). 
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National officials that enter the Commission are subject to an organisational “exposure effect” 
(Johnston 2005: 1039) that may contribute to re-socialise actors over time. Re-socialisation 
processes are often uni-directional in the sense that the socialisator educates, indoctrinates, 
teaches or diffuses his norms and ideas to the socialisee. The re-socialisation variable claims 
that officials’ role perceptions may change due to enduring experiences with institutions, 
accompanying new perceptions of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour (Herrmann and 
Brewer 2004: 14). Chief to the neo-functionalist approach, the potential for re-socialisation to 
occur (‘shift of loyalty towards a new centre’) is assumed positively related to the duration 
and the intensity of interaction among actors (Checkel 2001: 26; Haas 1958: 16). This claim 
rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship between the intensity of 
participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group develop 
perceptions of group belongingness and an esprit de corps. Socialisation is a dynamic process 
whereby individuals are induced into the norms and rules of a given community. Phrased 
otherwise, “more informal, face-to-face interaction increases the likelihood that individuals 
will do things they believe will be liked by liked others” (Johnston 2005: 1032). Protracted 
and intensive actor-interaction is conducive to internalisation of the norms, rules and interests 
of the community (Checkel 2005). Henceforth, the length of stay at the Commission may 
foster a re-socialisation of SNEs towards supranational role perceptions (Trondal 2004b). 
Moreover, SNEs are likely to re-evoke supranational roles ones they have become internalised 
and thereby strengthen this internalisation through repetition (Johnston 2005: 1022).  
 
This study suggests two proxies of re-socialisation: (i) The length of stay within the 
Commission (individual seniority among SNEs). Recent social constructivist literature 
suggests that the length of interaction increases the socialising potential of institutions 
(Checkel 2005: 811). Our test of the length variable is crucial because SNEs have short 
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careers within the Commission (maximum four years). Hence, if we indeed see an impact of 
the length variable among SNEs, a similar and even stronger effect is likely among permanent 
Commission officials. (ii) Re-socialisation is also measured by the intensity by which SNEs 
interact within the Commission. Studies of COREPER and Council working groups 
demonstrate that intensity of actor-interaction is positively related to the development of 
internalised norms like diffuse reciprocity, thick trust, mutual responsiveness, consensus and a 
“we-ness” (Lewis 2005: 949). Our proxy of the intensity variable is the amount of contact 
between SNEs and fellow colleagues with other national origins, as well as the amount of 
face-to-face interaction between SNEs and fellow colleagues during formal meetings in the 
Commission.  
 
Organisational incompatibility  
To illuminate how formal organisations may foster supranational roles among SNEs, this 
section brings “the domestic back in” by considering organisational incompatibility across 
levels of government (see Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Zurn and Checkel 2005: 1047). 
Behavioural transformation among SNEs requires some degree of organisational 
incompatibility between the domestic ministries and agencies and the Commission (Egeberg 
2005b). Organisational incompatibility creates mutual insulations of actors and organisations. 
This novelty argument claims that people that experience new situations are likely to change 
their role perceptions, notably towards a supranational logic (Hooghe 2005). Hence, SNEs 
with Commission portfolios that depart significantly from previous domestic portfolios are 
likely to experience a cognitive challenge towards shifting role perceptions towards a new 
centre. SNEs who enter the Commission for the first time are likely to discover non-
compatible working environments (March 1994: 70). For example, the physical structure of 
the Commission building, the presence of blue flag with the golden stars together with the 
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member-state flags may strengthen perceptions of novelty and organisational incompatibility. 
Perceptions of organisational incompatibility are arguably conducive to the evocation of new 
supranational behaviour among SNEs.  
 
When analysing organisational incompatibility the organisational structures of the composite 
parts need to be addressed. Organisations tend to accumulate conflicting organisational 
principles through horizontal and vertical specialisation (Olsen 2005). Political orders are 
often hybrids and inconsistent collections “of institutions that fit more or less into a coherent 
system” (Ansell 2004: 234; March and Olsen 2005: 8). When specialising formal 
organisations horizontally, two conventional principles have been suggested by Luther Gulick 
(1937). First, formal organisations may be specialised by the major purpose served – like 
research, health, food safety, etc. This principle tends to activate role perceptions among 
incumbents along sectoral (departmental) cleavages. Arguably, organisation by major purpose 
served is likely to bias the role perceptions of SNEs towards the departmental logic. The 
Commission DG and unit structure is a prominent example of this horizontal principle of 
specialisation (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). The Commission is a horizontally pillarised 
system of government specialised by purpose and with fairly weak organisational capabilities 
for horizontal co-ordination at the top through Presidential command (Dimitrakopoulos and 
Kassim 2005). Domestic central administrations are also typically organised according to the 
principle of purpose (Peters 1995: 158).  
 
A second principle of horizontal specialisation present within the Commission is the principle 
of the major process utilised – like administration, legal service, personnel services, etc. 
(Gulick 1937). This organisational principle encourages the horizontal integration of 
functional departments and the disintegration of the major purposes served. Within the 
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Commission the Legal Service and the DG for Translation illustrates the process principle. 
Moreover, domestic ministries are often organised by process, like ministries of 
administration, ministries of planning, etc. Arguably, organisation by major process is 
conducive to departmental and epistemic role perception among SNEs.  
 
Horizontal specialisation of these kinds is conducive to strengthening sub-unit roles and 
weakening allegiances towards the organisation as a whole (supranational). Moreover, lack of 
cross-unit mobility, as is the case among most SNEs, weakens the potential for supranational 
roles to emerge. However, the sheer fact that the Commission serve as their primary 
organisational affiliation may foster supranational behaviour among SNEs (Egeberg 2005b). 
The logic of primacy may thus trump the logic of recency. Moreover, organisational 
incompatibility across levels of government tends to create organisational insulation and 
thereby increase the likelihood that new role perceptions are discovered by actors.  
 
We suggest two proxies of organisational incompatibility: (i) The first proxy is the degree of 
compatible portfolios, as perceived by the SNEs themselves, across levels of government: did 
SNEs previously work in domestic ministries or agencies with a compatible or incompatible 
portfolio to their current Commission portfolios? (ii) The second proxy is the vertical 
organisational specialisation of the Commission. Officials tend to make affective ties 
primarily towards their sub-unit and less towards the organisation as a whole because most of 
their time and energy is consumed within organisational sub-units. One proxy of the vertical 
organisation of the Commission is the formal rank position of SNEs. Arguably, SNEs in top 
rank positions (for example A1) are more likely to identify with the organisation as a whole 
than SNEs in bottom rank positions (for example A8).  
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Data and method 
The observations reported below are based on a recent survey and interview study among 
SNEs in the Commission. The survey data results from a postal inquiry conducted in 2004 on 
a sample of 125 SNEs from different EU member-states and the EEA countries Norway and 
Iceland.4 After three rounds of reminders the final sample totals 72, giving a response rate of 
58 percent. This response rate is low compared to surveys in domestic central administrations, 
but higher than in recent studies of Commission officials (e.g. Hooghe 2005). The final 
sample covers SNEs from 15 Commission DGs5, five EU member-countries and two EEA 
countries.6 Moreover, the survey is supplemented by in-depth interviews among a sub-sample 
of SNEs. 22 interviews were conducted in the winter 2004 - 2005 on the basis of a semi-
structured interview-guide. The next section is illustrated with direct quotations from 
transcribed interviews.  
 
The survey and interview data are based on a systematic selection procedure. This procedure 
does not allow for empirical generalisations. Still, “[s]mall Ns can yield big conclusions” 
(Andersen 2003: 3 – original emphasis). One road to empirical generalisations is by reference 
to other empirical studies that support or reject our findings. In addition, our empirical 
observations are interpreted by reference to the composite institutional approach outlined 
above. However, the moderate number of respondents implies that conclusions are drawn 
with caution. 
 
Observations from the world of Commission SNEs 
This section is sequenced in two sub-sections: Step I reveals the relative primacy of 
supranational roles among SNEs as compared to intergovernmental, departmental and 
epistemic roles. Step II present two OLS regression analyses to illuminate how supranational 
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roles among SNEs is caused by (i) processes of pre-socialisation, (ii) processes of re-
socialisation, and (iii) organisational incompatibility across levels of government. 
 
Step I: The relative primacy of supranational roles among SNEs 
This section applies several proxies for measuring the four role sets outlined above. First, 
Table 1 reveals the relative importance of supranational, intergovernmental, departmental and 
epistemic loyalties among SNEs. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that SNEs evoke multiple roles. Being embedded into multiple 
institutions simultaneously SNEs have several representational roles to play. Importantly, 
SNEs activate fairly weak intergovernmental loyalties as compared to the supranational 
loyalties. This observation challenges previous studies of SNEs that underscore their national 
loyalties (Coombes 1970; Smith 1973; Smith 2001). The observations reported in Table 1 
may reflect the factual insulation of SNEs vis-à-vis their home governments (Trondal 2006). 
According to one SNE, “I have very little contact with my ministry back home, almost 
nothing” (interview – author’s translation).The two strongest loyalties observed among SNEs 
are epistemic and departmental. Hence, as expected, SNEs in medium rank positions in the 
Commission hierarchy attach stronger loyalty towards their own DG and profession than 
towards the Commission as a whole.  
 
Next, the respondents were asked to evaluate the roles played by other SNEs.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Table 2 confirms the observations of Table 1: SNEs report that other SNEs play mainly two 
representational roles – that as an ‘independent expert’ (epistemic role) and as a ‘DG/Unit 
representative’ (departmental role). Of less importance is the role as a ‘Commission 
representative’ (supranational role). The role as a ‘government representative’ 
(intergovernmental role) is perceived marginal to most SNEs.  
 
Moreover, our data demonstrate that SNEs rarely feel a conflict of loyalty between different 
constituencies, concerns and role ideals. SNEs tend to manage multiple roles (cf. Herrmann 
and Brewer 2004: 12). One SNE argue that, “my loyalty lies here with the Commission” 
(interview – author’s translation). Yet, many SNEs agree to the dictum, “I think in my heart I 
still represent my self” (interview – author’s translation). Hence, the assumed loyalty conflict 
between domestic and supranational constituencies is challenged by the observations 
presented in Table 1. However, we observe an inbuilt conflict between the role as a 
departmental official (‘DG/Unit representative’), an epistemic official (‘Independent expert’) 
and a supranational official (‘Commission representative’) among SNEs. We thus see a 
triangular role repertoire among SNEs. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 confirms the observations above: The allegiances emphasised by SNEs are ranked as 
follows: departmental allegiances, epistemic allegiances, supranational allegiances, and 
intergovernmental allegiances. Importantly, supranational allegiances rank significantly 
higher than intergovernmental allegiances. According to one SNE, “I travel around as a 
representative for the Commission and speak on behalf of the Commission in mass media. I 
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have a stronger responsibility for external contacts in the Commission than home in the 
ministry” (Interview – author’s translation). Another SNE argued that, “[w]e do not think 
according to nationality here. That is irrelevant. Nationality is only interesting over a cup of 
coffee” (interview – author’s translation). SNEs also have a supranational orientation when 
measured as follows: “I put forward proposals I think is in the best interests of the member-
states as a group” (73 percent strongly agree), and “I put forward proposals I think is in the 
best interest of the EU” (87 percent strongly agree). However, as expected, SNEs evoke 
stronger allegiances towards their DG, Unit and professional background than towards the EU 
and the Commission as wholes.  
 
Step II: Explaining actor-level supranationalism  
This section applies the independent variables introduced above to explain actor-level 
supranationalism among SNEs: (i) the pre-socialisation variable applies the following proxies: 
the international educational background of SNEs and their preference of leaving the 
Commission; (ii) the re-socialisation argument employs the following proxies: SNEs’ face-to-
face contacts inside the Commission in formal meetings, their interaction with fellow 
colleagues with other national origins outside office, as well as their individual seniority 
within the Commission; and finally (iii) the organisational argument utilises the following 
proxy: Incompatible portfolios between SNEs’ current Commission position and their 
previous occupation in domestic ministries and agencies (see Tables 5 and 6). The OLS 
regression analyses presented beneath utilise two proxies of actor-level supranationalism: 
perceptions of loyalty towards the Commission as a whole and towards the Director General 
of their DG (Table 4), and attitude change among SNEs generally as well as within their own 
portfolio (Table 5).  
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 47 demonstrates that organisational incompatibility across levels of government is 
conducive to supranational roles among SNEs. This relationship is stronger with respect to 
loyalties towards own DG (beta .36**) than towards the Commission as a whole (beta .31*). 
Hence, organisational incompatibility seems to challenge the cognitive frames of SNEs to 
redirect their loyalties towards a new centre – both towards the Commission as a whole as 
well as towards their DG. Notably, most SNEs stay in the same DG and the same Unit during 
their Commission career (97 percent and 88 percent, respectively). 
 
The impact of the formal hierarchy of the Commission is not revealed by Table 4. The SNEs 
studied are located at the A6 and A7 levels – the administrative level – of the Commission. 
Compared to top ranked Commission officials SNEs are less likely to attach strong feelings of 
loyalty towards the Commission as a whole and more strongly towards the DG and Unit 
levels. Tables 1, 2 and 3 give ample support for this assumption. Moreover, a Gamma test of 
the bivariate relationship between the formal rank of SNEs and their perceptions of loyalty 
towards the Commission as a whole finds a positive and significant correlation of Gamma 
.46*. Hence, we find a positive relationship between formal rank position of SNEs and the 
degree to which they evoke a supranational role. Due to their formal location within the 
Commission hierarchy, SNEs tend to put stronger emphasis on departmental and epistemic 
role than on their supranational role.  
 
Table 4 also demonstrates that SNES are indeed re-socialised into supranational officials: The 
intensity of interaction within the Commission is conducive to supranational roles among 
SNEs (beta .31*). More precisely, SNEs with a fairly large amount of informal face-to-face 
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interaction among fellow colleagues during meetings in the Commission have stronger loyalty 
towards their own Director General than SNEs with less informal face-to-face interaction. 
Table 4 also reveals a weak positive relationship between informal interaction with other 
nationalities outside office and loyalty towards the Commission as a whole.  
 
Table 4 reveals no significant effect of pre-socialisation among SNEs. For example, 
perceptions of loyalty towards the Commission as a whole are weakly associated with prior 
international educational experiences (beta .17). However, the SNEs were also asked if, 
before entering the Commission, they thought of EU co-operation as mainly advantageous or 
disadvantageous. A majority of SNEs reports being favourable to EU integration prior to the 
secondment period. Notably, 52 percent of the SNEs did not change attitude in this regard 
during their Commission career. Among those that changed opinion during their secondment 
period, the net tendency is towards more favourable attitudes towards EU integration. In sum, 
these observations demonstrate moderate dynamics of pre-socialisation of SNEs outside the 
Commission and strong processes of re-socialisation inside the Commission. This observation 
is confirmed by Table 5.   
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
As predicted by the re-socialisation variable, Table 5 reports a significant positive relationship 
between the seniority of SNEs and their likelihood of changing attitude towards pro-
integration in general. Seniority within the Commission also makes it more likely that SNEs 
become more positive to EU co-operation within their own portfolios. Some SNEs have prior 
experiences from other international organisations, transgovernmental committees and boards, 
and from the Permanent Representation in Brussels. However, Table 5 shows few indications 
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that SNEs are pre-socialised through their educational past. Moreover, our data indicates that 
most SNEs have a national family background (83 percent), and none of them have previously 
worked in other international organisations than the Commission. Henceforth, it seems 
unlikely that the supranational roles revealed in Tables 1,2 and 3 are caused by processes of 
pre-socialisation outside the Commission.8  
 
Conclusions 
This study demonstrates that the Commission manage to transform and redirect the role 
perceptions of individual civil servants. SNEs evoke multiple loyalties, notably towards their 
own profession (epistemic role), their DG and Unit (departmental role), and towards the EU 
and the Commission as wholes (supranational role). The old neo-functionalist claim that 
Commission officials may take on multiple roles is thus confirmed. Previous studies also 
show that departmental roles (portfolio roles) are rated higher than supranational roles within 
the College of Commissioners (Egeberg 2005a). The fact that SNEs evoke a stronger 
supranational role perception than an intergovernmental role perception is a crucial test of the 
transformative power of the Commission. These findings reflect both processes of re-
socialisation inside the Commission (length and intensity of interaction among SNEs), the 
organisational composition of the Commission (vertical and horizontal specialisation), as well 
as organisational incompatibilities between the Commission and domestic ministries and 
agencies. The data does not report robust evidence of pre-socialisation of SNEs outside the 
Commission. Hence, our findings challenge the sweeping claim made by Hooghe (2005) that 
processes of socialisation of Commission officials mainly occur at the national level and not 
inside the Commission. The Commission is indeed a ‘hothouse for supranationalism’. 
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As predicted by the composite institutional approach outlined above, previous studies show 
that permanent Commission officials evoke a stronger supranational role orientation than 
SNEs (Hooghe 2005). This is also shown within the College of Commissioners (Egeberg 
2005a). The stronger supranational orientation of permanent officials compared to SNEs may 
reflect processes of re-socialisation as well as the recruitment of permanent officials by merit 
(Shore 2000: 131; Wodak 2004: 107). However, whereas Hooghe (2005) see no significant 
effects of the length of time spent in the Commission on supranationalism among top 
Commission officials, this study shows that seniority among SNEs is significantly related 
with the emergence of supranational roles. The maximum seniority for a SNE is four years. 
Hence, it seems that the re-socialisation effect occur fairly quickly upon entry into the 
Commission (cf. Franklin and Scarrow 1999). Finally, the stronger supranational orientation 
among Commissioners as compared to SNEs may reflect the effect of the vertical 
specialisation of the Commission: Commissioners in top rank positions are more likely to 
identify with the organisation as a whole than SNEs in lower rank positions. 
 
Comparative studies of IEIs demonstrate that they have a fairly strong re-socialising power at 
the actor-level. Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 3) demonstrates that the Secretariat of IMF, the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Secretariat “were not simply 
following the demands issued by states but instead acting like the bureaucracies that they are”. 
Lewis (2005) also observes re-socialisation dynamics inside the COREPER whereby national 
officials internalise new community roles. Similarly, Johnston (2005: 1037) observes that the 
comparative study of international organisations find “some evidence that those individuals 
most directly exposed to intensive social interaction … are more likely to have a positive 
attitude towards multilateralism…”. Similarly, a comparative study of the European 
Commission, the WTO Secretariat and the OECD Secretariat observes supranational roles 
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among the IEI personnel (Trondal, Marcussen and Veggeland 2005). The study of Trondal, 
Marcussen and Veggeland (2005) shows that supranational roles among IEI personnel are 
associated with long tenure and a high intensity of actor-interaction among IEI officials. 
These observations support our findings on re-socialisation among SNEs in the Commission.  
 
Few studies have hitherto convincingly illuminated empirically how organisational 
compatibility/incompatibility is associated with actor-level supranationalism. This study 
merely indicates that supranational roles among SNEs are associated with organisational 
incompatibility across levels of government. Similarly, Jacobsson (l999) demonstrates that 
officials from Swedish sector ministries who enter the Council of Ministers redirect their role 
perceptions from a departmental role towards an intergovernmental role. Their national roles 
were “re-discovered” through exposure to the territorially organised Council of Ministers 
Hence, organisational incompatibilities across levels of government may cause actor-level 
supranationalism. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This study is financially supported by CONNEX (“Connecting Excellence on European Governance”), a 
Network of Excellence under the 6th. Framework Programme (http://www.connex-network.org/). 
2 By swearing an oath of neutrality and loyalty to the Commission, SNEs transfer their primary organisational 
affiliation from the member-state administration to the Commission. According to Art 7:1a in the new 
Commission rules for SNEs (2004), “the SNE shall carry out his duties and shall behave solely with the interest 
of the Commission in mind”. 
3 For example, Hooghe (2005:861) concludes that “support for supranational norms is relatively high, but that 
this is more due to national socialization than to socialization in the Commission”. Hooghe finds no significant 
effect of Commission socialisation (measured as the length of service in the Commission). This conclusion, 
however, rests on a fairly broad definition of supranationalism, “in essence, peoples’ beliefs about how the EU 
should be constituted” (Johnston 2005:1033). 
4 The initial sample resulted from a short-list of SNEs provided by the EFTA Secretariat and by CLENAD. 
5 The DGs covered by the study are: DG Education and Culture, DG Employment and Social Affairs, DG 
Enterprise, DG Environment, DG Energy and Transport, Eurostat, DG Fisheries, DG Health and Consumer 
Affairs, DG Information Society, DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs, DG Trade, DG Competition, and DG Development.  
6 EU member-states: Sweden (N=37), Denmark (N=3), Ireland (N=2), Germany (N=4) and France (N=1). EEA 
countries: Norway (N=20) and Iceland (N=2). Three respondents did not report their country of origin.  
7 Diagnosis of collinearity between the independent variables in Tables 4 and 5 unveils no indications of extreme 
multicollinearity. Thus, the independent variables have independent causal impact on the dependent variables. 
8 Moreover, the majority of SNEs arrive at the Commission from national ministries and agencies (83 percent). 
Only a small number of SNEs originate from universities or research institutes (four percent), private sector 
institutions (10 percent) and national non-governmental organisations (3 percent).  
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Tables 
Table 1: Percent of SNEs emphasising the following four loyalties (absolute numbers in 
parantheses) 
 Fairly much or 
very much 
Both/and Fairly little or 
very little 
Total 
Intergovernmental loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the member-
states as a group 
 
 
27 
 
 
30 
 
 
23 
 
100 
(66) 
Supranational loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the 
Commission as a whole 
 
 
65 
 
 
15 
 
 
20 
 
100 
(66) 
- Loyalty towards the Director 
General of own DG 
 
66 
 
16 
 
18 
100 
(67) 
Departmental loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the Director 
of own Directorate 
 
 
78 
 
 
12 
 
 
10 
 
100 
(68) 
- Neutral enforcement of 
decisions and established 
regulations within the 
Commission 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
100 
(64) 
Epistemic loyalty: 
- Professional neutrality within 
own position 
 
 
88 
 
 
9 
 
 
3 
 
100 
(65) 
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Table 2: SNEs’ perception of the representational roles evoked by other SNEs (percent – 
absolute numbers in parantheses) 
 Strongly agree Both/and Strongly disagree Total 
A ‘government 
representative role’ 
 
6 
 
33 
 
61 
 
100 (69) 
 A ‘Commission 
representative role’ 
 
39 
 
53 
 
8 
 
100 (64) 
A ‘DG/Unit representative 
role’ 
 
74 
 
22 
 
5 
 
100 (65) 
An ‘independent expert 
role’ 
 
74 
 
20 
 
6 
 
100 (69) 
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Table 3: Percent of SNEs feeling an allegiance (identify or feel responsible to) towards 
the following (absolute numbers in parentheses) 
 Fairly strongly 
or very 
strongly 
Both/and Fairly weakly or 
very weakly 
Total 
Intergovernmental 
allegiance: 
 - The government of own 
country 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
100 
(65) 
Supranational 
allegiance: 
- The EU system as a 
whole 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
100 
(64) 
- The Commission as a 
whole 
 
69 
 
22 
 
9 
100 
(67) 
Departmental allegiance: 
- The DG in which SNEs 
work 
 
 
84 
 
 
9 
 
 
7 
 
100 
(68) 
- The Unit in which SNEs 
work 
 
84 
 
10 
 
6 
100 
(68) 
Epistemic allegiance: 
Own professional 
(educational) background 
and expertise 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
100 
(67) 
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Table 4: Factors that relates to SNEs’ perception of loyalty towards the Commission as a 
whole and towards the Director General of their DG (Beta)a 
 Loyalty towards the 
Commission as a 
whole 
Loyalty towards 
the Director 
General of their 
DG 
Pre-socialisation outside the Commission: 
International educational backgroundb 
Wishes of leaving the Commissionc 
 
Re-socialisation inside the Commission: 
Face-to-face contacts inside the Commission in 
formal meetingsd 
Interaction with fellow colleagues with other 
national origins outside office 
Seniority within the Commissione 
 
Organisational incompatibility: 
Incompatible portfolios across levels of 
governmentf 
 
.17 
.09 
 
 
 
.11 
 
.18 
.06 
 
 
 
.31* 
 
.12 
-.01 
 
 
 
.31* 
 
.03 
.11 
 
 
 
.36** 
*) p ≤ 0.05         **) p ≤ 0.01                                                                      R2 = .15                          R2 = .20 
Key: 
a) The dependent variables have the following values: Value 1 (very much), value 2 (fairly much), value 3 
(both/and), value 4 (fairly little) and value 5 (very little).  
b) This variable is dichotomous by default: Value 1 (international university education), value 2 (national 
university education) 
c) This variable is dichotomous by default: Value 1 (yes), value 2 (no) 
d) This variable, and the next one, has the following values: Value 1 (very often ), value 2 (fairly often), 
value 3 (both/and), value 4 (fairly seldom), value 5 (very seldom). 
e) This variable is continuous ranging from 1 year to 11 years  
f) This variable has the following values: Value 1 (incompatible portfolio = previous professional 
occupation within domestic ministry or agency that do not correspond to current Commission 
portfolio), value 2 (compatible portfolio = previous professional occupation within domestic ministry or 
agency that correspond to current Commission portfolio). 
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Table 5: Factors that relates to attitude change among SNEs during their Commission 
career, generally as well as within their portfoliosa 
 Attitude change 
generally 
Attitude change 
within their 
portfolio 
Pre-socialisation outside the Commission: 
International educational backgroundb 
Wishes of leaving the Commissionc 
 
Re-socialisation inside the Commission: 
Face-to-face contacts inside the Commission in 
formal meetingsd 
Interaction with fellow colleagues with other 
national origins outside office 
Seniority within the Commissione 
 
Organisational incompatibility: 
Incompatible portfolios across levels of 
governmentf 
 
.10 
.07 
 
 
 
.01 
 
.04 
.-34* 
 
 
 
-.27 
 
.10 
.02 
 
 
 
-.11 
 
.06 
-.27 
 
 
 
-.22 
*) p ≤ 0.05         **) p ≤ 0.01                                                                      R2 = .21                          R2 = .14 
Key: 
a) The dependent variables have the following values: Value 1 (very much), value 2 (fairly much), value 3 
(both/and), value 4 (fairly little) and value 5 (very little).  
b) This variable is dichotomous by default: Value 1 (international university education), value 2 (national 
university education) 
c) This variable is dichotomous by default: Value 1 (yes), value 2 (no) 
d) This variable, and the next one, has the following values: Value 1 (very often ), value 2 (fairly often), 
value 3 (both/and), value 4 (fairly seldom), value 5 (very seldom). 
e) This variable is continuous ranging from 1 year to 11 years  
f) This variable has the following values: Value 1 (incompatible portfolio = previous professional 
occupation within domestic ministry or agency that do not correspond to current Commission 
portfolio), value 2 (compatible portfolio = previous professional occupation within domestic ministry or 
agency that correspond to current Commission portfolio). 
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